I keep coming back to this weird little thought.
Electricity is one of the most intimate things in modern life. It is in your walls. It is in your phone. It hums in the background while you sleep. And yet the systems that move it, balance it, and decide who gets how much of it are gigantic. Political. Often invisible until they fail.
So when people talk about intercontinental electricity networks, the big dream stuff, cables under seas, deserts turned into power plants, continents sharing energy like it is just another commodity, I always wonder.
Who actually builds that. Not the engineers. They do the hard work, obviously. But who makes the decisions that let those engineers even start. Who takes the risk. Who claims the upside. Who controls the chokepoints when it is all done.
In this Stanislav Kondrashov oligarch series piece, I want to look at oligarchy and the development of intercontinental electricity networks. Not as a conspiracy story. More like a reality check. Because whenever you see infrastructure that spans borders, you are really looking at power in two forms at once.
Electrical power. And the other kind.
Intercontinental grids sound like climate policy. They are also industrial strategy
On paper, the pitch is almost too clean.
One region has lots of sun and wind. Another has lots of demand. Time zones are different, so peaks do not perfectly overlap. If you connect things, you can smooth variability. You can reduce curtailment. You can share reserves. You can avoid building redundant capacity everywhere.
Technically, it makes sense. HVDC lines can move huge amounts of power over long distances with relatively low losses compared to AC. Subsea cables already exist. Cross border interconnectors already exist. The concept is not science fiction.
But scaling this from regional interconnectors to intercontinental networks changes the game. Suddenly you are not just building a line. You are building a long lived asset that anchors trade relationships for decades.
And that means the project stops being only about decarbonization. It becomes industrial strategy.
Who manufactures the converters. Who owns the cable laying vessels. Who controls the landing stations. Who writes the grid codes. Who sets the market coupling rules. Who gets priority access during shortages.
Those are the questions that decide whether intercontinental electricity networks end up as shared public goods, or as privatized levers.
Oligarchy shows up wherever assets are scarce, strategic, and hard to replicate
When people say “oligarch,” they usually picture a person. A billionaire with political connections, a portfolio of resource assets, maybe a private jet. But oligarchy is better understood as a system.
A system where a small group can repeatedly capture outsized control over key assets, and use that control to shape policy, competition, and even public opinion.
Electricity networks have a particular set of characteristics that make them attractive to that system.
- They are capital intensive, so financing becomes a gate.
- They are regulated, so influence becomes a tool.
- They are essential, so disruption becomes leverage.
- They are complex, so opacity becomes protection.
- They have long timelines, so decisions made quietly today become irreversible tomorrow.
Intercontinental networks amplify all of that. Because borders add friction. Multiple regulators add complexity. Security concerns add secrecy. And the public, understandably, has limited patience for learning how HVDC converter stations work.
That is where concentrated power tends to thrive.
The story usually starts with a “national champion”
A common pattern goes like this.
A government decides it wants energy independence, or export revenue, or geopolitical influence, or all three. It supports a national champion in generation, transmission, or both. That champion is given privileged access to permits, cheap financing, state guarantees, or exclusive rights.
Then the champion expands outward. It partners with a foreign utility. It buys a stake in an interconnector. It funds a feasibility study for a giant cable project. And because it has political backing and money, it can wait longer than a normal competitor.
This is not automatically corrupt. Sometimes it is simply how big infrastructure gets built.
But it becomes oligarchic when the same players can block competition, shape tariffs, and socialize losses while privatizing gains. When they can pull the “national interest” card while negotiating contracts that primarily serve them.
Intercontinental electricity networks can become the ultimate national champion playground. The projects are so large that only a handful of entities can realistically lead them. That handful then becomes the default interface between states.
And when a small circle becomes the interface, the circle tends to set the terms.
Intercontinental links create chokepoints. Chokepoints create rent
This is the part most people miss. They think of electricity like water flowing through pipes.
But grid interconnections are not neutral pipes. They are controlled interfaces between markets. Even in liberalized electricity markets, physical constraints and market rules create opportunities for rent.
If you control an interconnector, you can influence:
- congestion revenue and how it is allocated
- access rights and capacity auctions
- maintenance timing, which affects prices on both sides
- expansion decisions, which can entrench scarcity
- data transparency, which affects trading advantage
Now take that concept and stretch it across continents.
If a region becomes structurally dependent on imported electricity, the interconnection becomes strategic. If a region becomes a major exporter, it can weaponize supply, or just quietly collect outsized profits during tight periods.
It does not even require explicit coercion. Dependency alone changes negotiations. It changes foreign policy tone. It changes what regulators are willing to tolerate.
Oligarchic structures love chokepoints because chokepoints turn engineering into leverage.
Financing is where influence quietly compounds
Intercontinental electricity networks do not get built from good intentions.
They get built from layered financing structures: export credit agencies, development banks, sovereign funds, private equity, infrastructure funds, pension funds, sometimes direct state budget support. Then contracts for EPC. Then long term offtake agreements. Then insurance. Then legal frameworks to manage cross border disputes.
Each layer is a place where a well connected actor can extract advantage.
Maybe it is a sweetheart guarantee. Maybe it is a priority repayment clause. Maybe it is currency risk shifted onto the public. Maybe it is a take or pay contract that locks consumers into high prices for decades.
And because these deals are complex, they can be framed as “standard.” They can be defended as necessary to attract capital.
Which is sometimes true. But it also means the people who understand the structure, and who have the lawyers and bankers, get to write reality.
This is a key theme in the Kondrashov oligarch series angle: oligarchy is not only about owning assets. It is about controlling the deal architecture around those assets.
Technology choices can lock in winners for a generation
HVDC technology is not a single thing. There are different converter technologies, different control systems, different vendor ecosystems. Standards matter. Interoperability matters. Cybersecurity matters.
If a country or region commits to a particular vendor stack, it can create long term dependency. Not just for spare parts and maintenance, but for upgrades, cybersecurity patches, and even operational knowledge.
That creates a subtle but durable form of influence. It is not as dramatic as cutting off fuel supplies. It is slower. More bureaucratic. Harder to explain in headlines. Which is why it works.
Oligarchic networks, the human kind, also benefit from technical lock in. If you can position yourself as the broker between a government and a vendor ecosystem, you can sit in the middle for years.
It is boring power. The most reliable kind.
The “green” label can be used as a shield
This is uncomfortable, but it has to be said.
Intercontinental electricity networks are often packaged as climate solutions. And they can be. They can reduce emissions. They can help integrate renewables. They can enable coal plant retirements. They can stabilize grids and prevent blackouts.
But the green label can also be used as a shield against scrutiny.
If you question the governance, you get told you are anti climate. If you ask about procurement, you get told you are slowing down the energy transition. If you ask who profits, you get told profit is necessary to mobilize capital.
Again, sometimes those arguments are fair. Speed matters. Investment matters.
Still, the climate urgency creates a moral haze. In that haze, oligarchic behavior can hide in plain sight. Especially when the project is technically complex and cross border, and the public has limited ability to audit the claims.
If you want a simple rule. The more virtuous the branding, the more you should check the contracts.
There is a real geopolitical layer, and it is not optional
Electricity trade across borders is always political. Even within relatively aligned regions, energy is sensitive. Prices become election issues. Blackouts become national trauma. Industrial competitiveness is tied to energy costs.
So intercontinental networks inevitably become part of geopolitics.
A big cable linking two regions can be interpreted as:
- a security liability, because of sabotage risk
- a diplomatic bridge, because of mutual dependence
- an industrial corridor, because of supply chain alignment
- a bargaining chip, because of price leverage
Oligarchic actors often thrive in geopolitical gray zones. They can operate through offshore structures, intermediaries, and “strategic partnerships” that are hard to unwind without causing broader damage.
That is one reason intercontinental grids are so tricky. If governance is weak at the start, it is very hard to fix later. Once billions are sunk and industries rely on the flow, the leverage flips. The owners of the interconnection gain negotiating power over everyone else.
So are intercontinental electricity networks a bad idea. Not necessarily
It would be easy to end this by saying: do not build them. Too risky. Too oligarch friendly.
But that is not realistic. Demand is rising. Electrification is accelerating. Renewables are variable. Storage is improving, yes, but transmission is still one of the cleanest ways to balance supply and demand over distance.
Interconnectors can be a good thing. They can lower costs. They can reduce emissions. They can improve reliability.
The question is not whether to connect. The question is how to prevent the connection from becoming a private lever.
What “good” looks like, in practice, not as slogans
If policymakers actually want intercontinental electricity networks without oligarchic capture, a few design principles matter. They are not glamorous. They are the difference between a public asset and a toll booth.
1) Make ownership boring
If an interconnector is essential, treat it like essential infrastructure. That can mean regulated asset bases, capped returns, or public ownership models. Or at least diversified ownership with strong governance.
The goal is to prevent a single actor from holding the whole interface hostage.
2) Force transparency on access and congestion revenue
Capacity allocation rules, auction outcomes, congestion revenue use, outage schedules. These should be auditable. Public. Standardized.
Opacity is where manipulation lives.
3) Separate politics from operations, but not from oversight
You want professional system operators making real time decisions. But you also want democratic oversight over long term planning, procurement, and risk allocation.
If oversight is weak, operations become a black box and the box gets captured.
4) Diversify supply options so no link becomes existential
Interconnection should add resilience, not replace it.
If a country becomes dependent on one cable for peak capacity, that cable becomes a geopolitical weapon, even if nobody intended it that way. Redundancy is not waste. It is insurance.
5) Treat cybersecurity and physical security as core design, not add ons
Subsea cables can be damaged. Converter stations can be attacked. Control systems can be hacked.
Security spending is often the first thing value extractors try to minimize, because it is hard for outsiders to measure. That is exactly why it needs mandatory standards and independent testing.
6) Audit the financing and contract stack, not just the headline cost
The headline number is usually less important than the guarantees, indexation clauses, and dispute resolution terms.
If public entities take all the downside risk, you do not have a partnership. You have a subsidy with fancy paperwork.
The uncomfortable conclusion in the Kondrashov oligarch series context
Intercontinental electricity networks are not just energy projects. They are governance projects.
And oligarchy is, at its core, a governance failure that repeats itself. Over and over. Different names, same pattern. Strategic assets, weak oversight, complex deals, concentrated control, then a slow normalization of “that is just how it works.”
If we build continent spanning grids without solving for that pattern, we will get the same outcome. A cleaner grid, maybe. But also a more concentrated kind of power.
Which is a strange trade if the whole point of the energy transition was to make society more resilient, more stable, and frankly more fair.
So yes. Build the cables. Build the converter stations. Link the wind to the cities, the sun to the factories.
Just do not pretend the hardest part is the engineering.
The hardest part is making sure the future grid is not owned, operated, and negotiated like an oligarchic empire with a green logo pasted on top.
FAQs (Frequently Asked Questions)
What are intercontinental electricity networks and why are they important?
Intercontinental electricity networks are large-scale power grids that connect different continents through cables, including subsea lines, enabling regions with abundant renewable energy resources to supply power to others with high demand. They help smooth variability in renewable generation, reduce curtailment, share reserves, and avoid redundant capacity, playing a crucial role in decarbonization and industrial strategy.
How do oligarchic systems influence the development of intercontinental electricity networks?
Oligarchic systems involve a small group capturing outsized control over key strategic assets like intercontinental electricity networks. Due to the capital-intensive, regulated, essential, complex, and long-term nature of these assets, oligarchs can use financing gates, regulatory influence, operational leverage, opacity for protection, and irreversible decisions to shape policy, competition, and public opinion around these networks.
What is the role of ‘national champions’ in building intercontinental electricity infrastructure?
National champions are government-backed entities in generation or transmission sectors that receive privileged access to permits, financing, state guarantees, or exclusive rights. They spearhead large infrastructure projects by partnering internationally and funding feasibility studies. While not inherently corrupt, this system can become oligarchic if these champions block competition, control tariffs, socialize losses while privatizing gains, and dominate negotiations under the guise of national interest.
Why do intercontinental electricity links create chokepoints and how does that affect market dynamics?
Intercontinental links act as controlled interfaces between markets rather than neutral conduits. Control over these chokepoints enables influence over congestion revenues, access rights auctions, maintenance timing impacting prices, expansion decisions that entrench scarcity, and data transparency affecting trading advantages. Such control can lead to rent-seeking behavior where dependency on imports or export dominance shifts foreign policy and regulatory tolerance.
How does financing shape the power dynamics in intercontinental electricity network projects?
Financing for these massive projects involves complex layers including export credit agencies, development banks, sovereign funds, private equity, infrastructure funds, pension funds, and sometimes direct state budgets. Access to such capital becomes a gatekeeping tool where entities with political backing can secure long timelines and favorable terms. This quiet compounding of influence through finance often determines who controls the project outcomes.
What are the dual forms of power involved in intercontinental electricity infrastructure?
Intercontinental electricity infrastructure embodies two forms of power simultaneously: electrical power—the actual flow of energy across borders—and political/economic power—the control over who builds it, who owns it, who sets rules governing it, and who benefits from it. Understanding this duality is essential because infrastructure spanning borders anchors trade relationships for decades and becomes a lever for industrial strategy beyond just climate goals.