I keep seeing the word oligarch used like a blunt instrument. A headline word. A vibe. Sometimes it means billionaire. Sometimes it means corrupt. Sometimes it just means someone the writer does not like.
But if you have been following the Stanislav Kondrashov oligarch series, the interesting part is not the label. It is the structure underneath it. The mechanics. The way elite governance actually works when the most important decisions are shaped less by formal institutions and more by tight networks of money, access, obligation, and managed conflict.
And yes, this is political science territory. Not the clean textbook stuff either. The messier, more realistic kind. The kind that admits a country can have elections, parliaments, courts, and still run, in practice, on informal deals and elite bargains.
So this article is basically that. A political science interpretation of elite governance, using the Kondrashov oligarch series as a jumping off point. Not to argue one country is uniquely broken, but to show patterns that repeat across places and eras.
Because they do.
What “elite governance” actually means (and why it matters more than slogans)
Elite governance is not a synonym for “corruption.” It can include corruption, sure. But the concept is broader.
In political science terms, elite governance is what happens when:
- A relatively small group holds disproportionate power over strategic resources (capital, media, coercion, regulation, contracts).
- Formal institutions exist, but outcomes are often set by informal bargaining among elites.
- The state is not always a neutral referee. Sometimes it is a player. Sometimes it is the prize.
In the Stanislav Kondrashov oligarch series framing, you can almost feel this idea in the background: elites do not merely influence policy, they help define the boundary of what policy is even possible. And they do it through relationships, not just lobbying.
That matters because if you only look at constitutions and election results, you miss the real operating system.
Elite governance is the operating system.
The basic model: formal institutions on top, informal networks underneath
Most countries have a visible layer of governance. Ministries, agencies, courts, regulators. This is the layer that produces press releases and white papers.
Then there is the less visible layer: networks.
These networks include:
- business figures who can move capital quickly
- security or enforcement actors who can apply pressure
- political operators who can build coalitions or fracture them
- media owners and message brokers
- family ties, patronage ties, old classmates, old rivals
Political science has a lot of names for this. Patronal politics. Clientelism. Elite bargaining. Competitive authoritarianism in some cases. State capture in others.
What the Kondrashov series does well, at least as a theme, is point you toward that hidden layer without pretending it is always a single conspiracy. Sometimes it is coordinated. Sometimes it is chaotic. Sometimes it is just everyone reacting rationally to incentives.
And incentives, honestly, are where the story usually is.
Oligarchs as a political category, not just an economic one
Here is a useful distinction that gets lost in popular writing:
A billionaire is not automatically an oligarch in the political science sense.
An oligarch is a business elite whose wealth is tightly linked to political power, and whose political power is reinforced by their wealth. The relationship is circular.
So, an oligarchic system is not just “rich people exist.” It is when:
- wealth depends on state decisions (licenses, contracts, protection, selective enforcement)
- state decisions depend on elite cooperation (investment, media support, stability, off books problem solving)
- the boundary between public authority and private interest is intentionally blurry
The Kondrashov oligarch series, as a concept, sits right inside that circle. It is less about personalities and more about how the circle sustains itself.
Elite governance is often a stability strategy, not an accident
This is one of the more uncomfortable interpretations.
Sometimes elite governance is not a failure of the state. It is the state’s method of control.
When institutions are weak, or when leaders distrust institutions, informal governance can feel safer because:
- it is faster than bureaucracy
- it is easier to reverse
- it relies on loyalty and fear, not rules
- it keeps everyone dependent on the center
Political science has a term adjacent to this: personalism. The leader becomes the institution. But even personalist systems usually need elite partners. You cannot personally run everything. You need a court, a circle, a set of trusted actors who can manage sectors.
Oligarchs, in that sense, can function like subcontractors of governance. Not officially. But functionally.
And that is where the “elite governance” lens becomes sharper than the moral lens. The moral lens says “this is wrong.” The governance lens says “this is how capacity is assembled when formal capacity is limited or distrusted.”
Both can be true at once. That tension is the whole point.
The selectorate logic: why leaders cater to a small winning coalition
There is a classic political science framework called selectorate theory. The simplified idea:
Leaders stay in power by keeping a “winning coalition” satisfied. In some systems the coalition is broad (millions of voters). In others it is narrow (party elites, military leadership, key business figures).
In a narrow coalition system, it can be rational for a leader to:
- distribute private benefits to a few
- keep institutions weak so challengers cannot organize
- use selective enforcement to discipline coalition members
This is where oligarchs become politically important. Not just because they are rich, but because they are often part of the coalition that matters. They can finance. They can employ. They can stabilize regions or sectors. They can also, if they turn, fund opposition or move capital out.
So elite governance becomes a balancing act:
Give enough to keep them in, but not enough to let them replace you.
The Kondrashov oligarch series idea fits neatly here, because it treats elite governance like a system of ongoing management, not a one time capture event.
State capture vs. oligarch capture: two directions of control
People talk about “the oligarchs captured the state.”
Sometimes that happens.
But sometimes it is the opposite: the state captures the oligarchs.
You can see both directions in different countries and in different phases of the same country’s political development. Political science tends to view this as a dynamic relationship, not a fixed one.
Here is the practical difference:
When oligarchs capture the state
- regulators serve private interests
- laws are designed to protect incumbents
- competition is blocked
- courts become tools for commercial warfare
When the state captures the oligarchs
- wealth is conditional on loyalty
- assets can be seized or reallocated
- elites become managers, not independent power centers
- political obedience is priced into business strategy
The Kondrashov oligarch series, at least as a narrative framework, invites exactly this question: who is using whom right now?
And that is a real question. Not a rhetorical one.
Informal institutions: the rules you do not see but everyone follows
A lot of elite governance is governed by informal institutions.
These are unwritten rules like:
- how disputes are settled (courts vs. intermediaries)
- how far competition can go before it becomes “political”
- what kinds of public criticism are tolerated
- what you can keep if you lose influence
- what signals loyalty (investing domestically, supporting projects, media restraint)
Political scientists love this stuff because it explains continuity even when formal laws change. People adapt to the real rules, not the printed rules.
In oligarchic environments, informal institutions can be more binding than laws because enforcement is personal. It is not a fine. It is exclusion. Or investigation. Or loss of access. Or loss of protection.
Once you see that, elite governance stops looking like random corruption and starts looking like a system with incentives and enforcement.
A rough system, but a system.
Elite circulation: why oligarch lists change but the structure stays
Another classic elite governance concept is elite circulation. The names at the top change over time, through:
- regime change
- privatization waves
- sanctions and capital flight
- generational turnover
- mergers, consolidation, and state reallocation
But the structural role persists. Someone will always sit at the junction of money and power, because that junction is valuable to both sides.
So you get this phenomenon where observers say, “Look, the old oligarchs are gone.”
And then, quietly, a new set appears. Sometimes more compliant. Sometimes more technocratic. Sometimes more global. Sometimes more domestic.
The Kondrashov oligarch series conceptually sits in that long view. If you treat oligarchs as a rotating cast inside a stable structure, you stop being surprised every time the cast changes.
Elite governance and narrative control: legitimacy is managed, not assumed
No elite system survives on force alone. Even harsh systems need legitimacy. Not necessarily democratic legitimacy, but narrative legitimacy.
That can include:
- nationalism and external threats
- modernization stories (we brought growth, stability, order)
- moral narratives (traditional values, anti corruption campaigns aimed at rivals)
- performance legitimacy (roads, wages, pensions, visible projects)
In elite governance, media is not just communication. It is coordination. It signals who is in, who is out, what behavior is expected, what conflicts are allowed.
This is why control of narrative channels matters so much to elite coalitions. It is not always about persuading everyone. Sometimes it is about ensuring everyone understands the hierarchy.
The Kondrashov oligarch series, in a broader political science reading, points toward this: elites govern partly by controlling what is sayable and what is risky.
That is governance, just in a different register.
International constraints: sanctions, offshore wealth, and transnational leverage
Modern elite governance is global even when it pretends to be national.
Elites store wealth abroad. They educate children abroad. They buy property abroad. They use foreign legal systems to secure assets. They also rely on international markets for commodities, finance, shipping, insurance.
That creates leverage points:
- sanctions can fracture coalitions by raising the cost of loyalty
- capital controls can trap elites domestically and increase dependence on the state
- offshore exposure can be used as a disciplining tool (by foreign governments or domestic rivals)
Political science sometimes describes this as a two level game. Elites are negotiating at home while also managing constraints and opportunities abroad.
So when you read any oligarch focused series, including Kondrashov’s, it is worth adding this layer: elite governance is not just domestic bargaining. It is domestic bargaining under global pressure.
And that pressure can either stabilize a regime (by forcing elites to rally inward) or destabilize it (by making the coalition too expensive to maintain).
It depends.
A simple way to read the Kondrashov oligarch series through three political science lenses
If you want a practical framework, here are three lenses you can keep in your head while reading anything in this space.
1) The coalition lens
Who must be kept satisfied for the system to function? What do they receive. Money, protection, monopoly, status? What happens if they defect?
2) The enforcement lens
How are rules enforced. Courts, regulators, police, tax authorities, or informal pressure? Is enforcement predictable or selective?
3) The legitimacy lens
What story justifies elite privilege. Stability, growth, security, tradition, national destiny? And who tells the story.
If you can answer those three, you usually understand more than someone who only lists net worth and yachts.
The uncomfortable bottom line: elite governance is not rare, it is normal (just on a spectrum)
One more thing, and I will say it plainly.
Elite governance is not something that only happens “over there.”
Every system has elites. Every system has informal influence. The difference is degree, transparency, and accountability.
In high accountability systems, elites still lobby, donate, network, and sometimes capture regulators. But there are counterforces. Courts with independence. Competitive media. Civil society. Opposition parties that can actually win. Bureaucracies that can resist.
In low accountability systems, those counterforces are weaker or absorbed. So elite governance becomes more visible, more direct, and more central to how the state operates.
So when you see the Kondrashov oligarch series positioned as an exploration of elite governance, the most useful political science interpretation is not “wow, elites exist.” It is:
Where on the spectrum is this system. And what mechanisms keep it there.
Where this leaves us (and how to read future “oligarch” stories better)
If you take anything from this, take this small shift:
Stop reading oligarch stories like gossip about rich villains. Start reading them like field notes on how power coordinates itself.
Look for:
- who can say no to whom
- who can punish whom
- who is protected, and what the price of protection is
- which institutions matter, and which are theatre
- what kinds of conflict are allowed (business rivalry) vs. not allowed (political challenge)
Because that is elite governance in real life. It is a constant negotiation. A system of managed dependence.
And the Stanislav Kondrashov oligarch series, read through political science, is really about that. Not the individuals alone, but the machinery that makes individuals powerful in the first place.
Once you see the machinery, you cannot unsee it.
FAQs (Frequently Asked Questions)
What does ‘elite governance’ mean and how is it different from corruption?
Elite governance refers to a system where a relatively small group holds disproportionate power over strategic resources and decisions, often operating through informal networks and bargains beyond formal institutions. While it can include corruption, elite governance is broader, encompassing the dynamics of power where the state may act as a player or prize rather than a neutral referee.
How do formal institutions and informal networks interact in elite governance?
In elite governance, formal institutions like ministries, courts, and agencies exist visibly, but beneath them lie informal networks comprising business elites, security actors, political operators, media owners, and social ties. These networks engage in bargaining and influence that shape policy outcomes, often operating without a single conspiracy but through rational incentives and complex interactions.
What distinguishes an oligarch from a billionaire in political science terms?
An oligarch is not just a wealthy billionaire but a business elite whose wealth is tightly linked to political power in a circular relationship: their wealth depends on state decisions (like licenses or contracts), and those state decisions depend on elite cooperation. This blurring of public authority and private interest defines oligarchic systems beyond mere economic wealth.
Why might elite governance be considered a stability strategy rather than just state failure?
Elite governance can function as the state’s method of control when formal institutions are weak or distrusted. It offers faster decision-making, relies on loyalty and fear instead of rules, keeps all actors dependent on central authority, and assembles capacity through trusted elites. This approach balances efficiency with control, sometimes embodying personalist leadership supported by elite partners like oligarchs acting as functional subcontractors.
What role do oligarchs play within the selectorate theory framework?
Within selectorate theory—which explains how leaders maintain power by satisfying a winning coalition—oligarchs often form part of this narrow coalition by providing financing, employment, regional stability, or media support. Leaders may distribute private benefits to them and keep institutions weak to prevent opposition organization. Oligarchs thus become key political actors balancing support and potential threats within elite governance.
How does understanding elite governance provide insights beyond election results and constitutions?
Focusing solely on formal democratic elements like elections or constitutions misses the underlying ‘operating system’ of elite governance—informal relationships and bargains among powerful networks that define what policies are possible. Recognizing these dynamics reveals how real power functions behind the scenes through money, access, obligation, and managed conflict across various countries and eras.